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I. INTRODUCTION
Employee privacy litigation is a relatively new and rapidly ex-
panding area of employment law in the United States. Between 1985
and 1987 almost one hundred workplace privacy jury verdicts were
reported with an average verdict of $316,000.1 The potential for future
expansion of employee privacy litigation is indicated in one survey
which reports twenty times more workplace privacy jury verdicts
were entered against employers in the period from 1985 to 1987 than
in the period from 1981 to 1984.2
1. 1. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, WORKPLACE PRIVACY 1 (1987) [hereinafter WoRx-
PLACE PRVACY].
2. Id at2.
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The rapid growth in employee privacy litigation is largely attribu-
table to the growing tendency of employers to require their employees
to undergo urinalysis drug testing as a condition of continuing employ-
ment.3 As the number of employers requiring employee drug testing
increases, it is reasonable to assume that employee privacy litigation
will increase accordingly. Future increases in employee privacy litiga-
tion seem especially likely in light of the strong, conflicting interests
of employers and employees in suits challenging the validity of
mandatory employee drug testing programs.
Employers have strong interests in ensuring that their employees
do not abuse alcohol or other drugs on the job. Employee alcohol
abuse alone cost American industry approximately $50.6 billion in lost
workforce productivity in 1980.4 The sheer magnitude of employer
losses attributable to employee alcohol and drug abuse provides a
strong, legitimate incentive for employers to take affirmative steps to
improve employee performance, workplace safety, and workplace se-
curity. Mandatory employee drug testing is rapidly becoming the em-
ployer's primary tool for protecting its interests.
Although employers have significant interests in ensuring a drug-
free workforce, when employers elect to achieve that objective by re-
quiring employee drug testing, their interests collide with significant
employee privacy interests. The level of protection an employee re-
ceives against employer intrusions into employee privacy is largely a
function of the individual employment setting.
Public sector employees have a greater degree of privacy protec-
tion than any other class of employee. Public employee drug testing
raises issues of constitutional magnitude. Public employees have chal-
lenged their employers' drug testing programs on first, fourth, fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendment grounds placing principal reliance
on the fourth amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A number of courts considered the issue and
determined public employee drug testing satisfied the fourth amend-
ment's "reasonableness" requirement only when the required testing
was based on "individualized reasonable suspicion" that the testee was
under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs while on duty.5
In contrast to their public sector counterparts, private employees
enjoy no constitutional privacy protection against employer drug test-
ing programs.6 The amount of discretion a private employer has to
3. Id at 1, 18-19.
4. Podolsky, RTI Report Economic Cost of Alcohol Abuse and Alcholism, ALCOHOL
HEALTH & REs. WORLD 34, 35 (Winter 1984-85).
5. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Feliciano v.
City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987); National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
6. Monroe v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
[Vol. 67:211
EMPLOYER DRUG TESTING
unilaterally implement mandatory employee drug testing depends on
whether its employees are represented by unions, have individual em-
ployment contracts of definite duration, or are at-will.
As a general rule, an employer must bargain with its employees'
union representative before implementing mandatory employee drug
testing, or face potential liability for unfair labor practices." When a
private employee has an individual employment contract of definite
duration, the terms of the contract, either expressed or implied, will
govern whether the employee can be required to undergo drug testing
as a condition of continuing employment.8
Private sector, at-will employees comprise the class of employees
most vulnerable to employer-mandated drug testing. In the absence
of federal or state constitutional protections of their privacy, this class
of employees is increasingly resorting to common law and statutorily
created tort theories to challenge the validity of their employers' drug
testing programs.
The scope of the following analysis is narrow and focused on the
validity of employee drug testing programs in the private, at-will em-
ployment context. The purpose of the following analysis is also nar-
row-to analyze the applicability of Nebraska's statutorily created
intrusion/invasion of privacy tort in the private, at-will employee drug
testing context.9
II. THE INVASION OF PRIVACY TORT
The right of privacy is a relatively recent concept in Anglo-Ameri-
can law. The legal concept of the right of privacy was first articulated
less than one hundred years ago in 1890, by Samual Warren and Louis
Brandeis.10 In their landmark law review article, Brandeis and War-
ren recognized that the broad principle of the right of privacy- "the
right to be let alone"-was implicit in a number of common law defa-
mation and property rights cases.11 When reading their landmark
work, it is hard to believe they were writing in 1890. They just as eas-
ily could have been talking about employee drug testing programs in
1987 when they stated:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern
7. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g. Co., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1368 (1987) (advice memoranda
NLRB general council).
8. True, Common Law Principals Affecting Drug Testing of Employees, 265-66
(June 25, 1987) (ABA Satellite Seminar:. Drug Testing in the Workplace).
9. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 211 (1986).
10. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter
Right to Privacy].
11. IL See also WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 5.
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enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury.1 2
American courts grappled with this amorphous right for seventy
years before William Prosser imposed a coherent structure on the
right of privacy in 1960.13 According to Prosser there are four distinct
kinds of invasion of privacy interests under the classic theory of the
right of privacy: 1) intrusion upon a person's solitude or seclusion;
2) public disclosure of private facts about a person; 3) publicity which
puts a person in a "false light" in the public eye; and 4) appropriation
of a person's name or likeness for the appropriator's benefit.14
This classic theory of the right of privacy has been adopted, with
minor variations, in all fifty states.'5 Thirty-seven states have judi-
cially recognized a common law right of privacy and the remaining
thirteen states have created a right of privacy by statute.16 Each of the
four torts within the penumbra of the classic theory have been applied
in the workplace context, with varying degrees of employee success.' 7
A. Appropriation
This branch of the invasion of privacy tort has no application in the
employee drug testing context. Often referred to as the "right to pub-
licity," the tort of appropriation protects individual property interests
in the use of names and likenesses for the benefit of the appropria-
tor.1 s The protection provided by Nebraska's appropriation statute is
limited to appropriations for the "commercial" or "advertising" bene-
fit of the appropriator.19 In older employment cases, employees have
sued their employer for appropriating their right to publicity, but
12. Right to Privacy, supra note 10, at 196.
13. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
14. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 117, at 851, 854, 856, 863 (5th ed. 1984). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977).
15. WORKPLACE PRiVACY, supra note 1, at 5.
16. Right of Privacy, 1979: Hearings on L.B. 384 Before the Judiciary Comm. of the
Nebraska Unicameral, 10-11 (Feb. 6, 1979) [hereinafter Hearings]. (Statement by
Sen. Landis noting Nebraska and Rhode Island were the only two states without
a statutory or common law right of privacy). In 1980, Rhode Island joined the
other forty-nine states and created a statutory right of privacy. See R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1983 Cum. Supp.). For examples of other statutorily created
rights to privacy see N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 839 (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-3-1 (1982); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-216.1 (1982).
17. WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 6.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). Section 652C expressly pro-
vides: "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." Id.
19. Specifically, NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-202 (1986) provides: "Any person, firm, or cor-
poration that exploits a natural person, name, picture, portrait, or personality for
advertising or commercial purposes shall be liable for invasion of privacy." Sec-
[V7ol. 67:211
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these efforts were generally unsuccessful. 20
B. False Light Publicity
The false light invasion of privacy tort is designed to protect and
provide relief to an individual for another's publication of matters
concerning the individual which places the individual in a false light.21
The matters disclosed must be given publicity such as media disclosure
or disclosure to a large enough group of people that it is a substantial
certainty the matter will become public knowledge.2 2 The resulting
false light must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Addition-
ally, the person making the disclosure must have acted with knowl-
edge of, or reckless disregard as to, the falsity of the matter and the
false light in which the disclosure would place the individual.23
Although false light invasion is closely related to defamation, one
need not be defamed to successfully maintain a false light action.24
The underlying facts that support a false light claim will not necessar-
ily support a defamation claim; although, when the underlying facts
are sufficient to support a defamation claim, such facts would also sup-
port a false light claim.
False light claims by employees against employers have generally
been unsuccessful due to the employees' failure to satisfy the publicity
element of such a claim.25 In Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v.
tion 20-202 also exempts appropriations for bona fide news report and non-com-
mercial, public interest advertising purposes. Id at § 20-202(1).
20. See, e.g., Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (Employee
sued his employer for appropriation/invasion of privacy for employer's
photographing him while he worked. Held: Employer's photographing employee
for purpose of studies to increase efficiency of employer's operations and promote
safety was not a violation of employee's right to privacy.).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). Section 652E expressly
provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the ac-
tor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed.
Cf NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-204 (1986). Nebraska's false light tort is defined in lan-
guage identical to § 652E, except the statute expressly exposes "any person, firm,
or corporation" to potential false light liability. Id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment a (1977).
23. See ici § 652E.
24. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wash. 2d 466, 468, 722 P.2d
1295,1297 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652E comment b (1977); W.
PROSSER & W. KETON, supra note 14, § 117, at 863.
25. See, ag., Dzierwa v. Michigan Oil Co., 152 Mich. App. 281, 393 N.W.2d 610 (1986)
(Discharged employee sued former employer for false light invasion of privacy
because of false statements made by employer's agent in the presence of other
1988]
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Wherry,26 an employee successfully maintained a defamation action
against his former employer.27 However, the facts in W7herry would
have supported a false light claim as well as the successful defamation
claim.
In Wherry, the employee was tested for drugs after involvment in
an on-the-job accident and tested positive for methadone. One of the
employer's officials noted on the accident report that methadone was
used by heroin addicts for withdrawal treatment. Another employee
sent a letter to the United States Department of Labor which stated a
physician had determined traces of methadone were present in the
former employee's system at the time of the accident.28
The former employee in Wherry won a jury verdict of $150,000 for
injuries suffered as a result of the statements accusing him of being a
drug user and $50,000 in punitive damages.29 The Texas Civil Court of
Appeals affirmed the jury verdict in its entirety.3 0 Because the em-
ployer knew of the statement's falsity two weeks prior to the defama-
tory publication (after undergoing independent drug screening, the
employee had tested negative for all common drugs), the court found
the evidence supported the jury's defamation verdict.31
All the elements of a false light claim were present in Wherry.
First, falsely disclosing that an employee was a drug user outside work
placed the employee in a false light. Second, such a disclosure would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Third, the employer's dis-
closure, after receiving the employee's negative test results, clearly
constituted acting with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the fal-
sity of the matters disclosed. Finally, the letter to the Department of
Labor could arguably satisfy the publicity requirement. The employee
would, therefore, have established a prima facie false light claim.32
Private sector employers who are using - or planning to imple-
ment - mandatory employee drug testing programs must have built-
in disclosure control mechanisms to avoid the problems faced by the
employees. Held: False light claim dismissed for failure to satisfy the publicity
element as agent's statements were only made in the presence of a small number
of employees and nothing indicated the statements were "broadcast to the public
in general or publicized to a large number of people.") See also Eddy v. Brown,
715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986) (The court dismissed an employee's false light claim
against his employer, supervisor, and foreman, holding that the fact that a limited
number of co-workers heard the employee was undergoing psychiatric treatment
was insufficient to satisfy the publicity element because the disclosure was not to
the general public.).
26. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
27. Id.
28. Id- at 745-48.
29. Id. at 743.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 743, 748, 755.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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employer in Wherry. Any communications to third parties concern-
ing an employee's drug test results should be narrow, factual, and
privileged. If such communications are true and nonconclusary, the
employee who is the subject of the communication will be unable to
establish a false light claim.33
C. Disclosure of Private Matters
The purpose of this branch of the classic theory is to protect and
provide relief to an individual for another's publication of matters
concerning the individual's private life.34 The matters disclosed must
be given publicity such as media disclosure or disclosure to a large
enough group of people that there is a substantial certainty that the
matter will become public knowledge.35 Moreover, the disclosure
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate
concern to the public.36
A cause of action based on wrongful disclosure of private informa-
tion does not exist in Nebraska.37 When the Nebraska legislature en-
acted the statutory right of privacy, it incorporated only three of the
four branches of the classic theory, declining to adopt the "publicity of
private matters" branch. The wrongful disclosure of private matters
tort exists in other states, however, and employees have had some suc-
cess in bringing this action against their employers.38 In this branch,
an employee's wrongful disclosure action against the employer could
be based on a variety of private facts such as sexual relations, family
33. See Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529 (1984)
(Discharged employee sued former employer for false light invasion of privacy
based on employer's subsequent communication to another concerning the reason
for her discharge. Held: Trial court properly dismissed the employee's false light
claim because such a claim could not be grounded on the employer's communica-
tion of the reasons for her discharge to another when the employee did not dis-
pute she had been discharged for the reasons communicated.).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Section 652D provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
35. I at comment a.
36. See id- § 652D.
37. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 211 (1986).
38. Compare Levias v. United Airlines, 27 Ohio App. 3d 222, 500 N.E.2d 370 (1985)
with Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986). In
Levias, a flight attendant's employer was held liable for disclosure of private facts
invasion of privacy due to a medical examiner's disclosure of the attendant's con-
fidential medical information to her supervisor. However, in Bratt, the court em-
ployed a balancing test, holding that the employer's business interests in
publishing medical information concerning an employee's psychiatric problems to
the employee's supervisors outweighed the employee's privacy interests.
1988]
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quarrels, intimate letters, or medical information.39
D. Intrusion Upon Seclusion or Solitude
The intrusion branch of the classic theory protects an individual
from intentional intrusions by others-physical or otherwise-upon
the individual's solitude, seclusion, or personal affairs.40 A plaintiff in
an intrusion action needs to establish only two essential elements to
make out a prima facie case: 1) that the defendant intruded upon the
plaintiff's solitude or seclusion; and 2) that the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.4 1
The intrusion/invasion of privacy tort has been recognized as the
most applicable of the four branches of the classic theory for private,
at-will employees to successfully challenge the validity of their em-
ployers' drug testing programs.42 The intrusion action is especially ap-
pealing to employees because there is no publicity or publication
requirement for a successful intrusion action.43 "The intrusion itself
makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publi-
cation or any use of any kind of photograph or information" obtained
by the intrusion.44 Thus, even if an employer takes no action against
an employee who tests positive for illegal drugs, the employer may be
liable for intrusion upon the employee's solitude if the employee can
satisfy the critical element of the "highly offensive" nature of the
intrusion.45
III. THE CURRENT LAW OF INTRUSION
As of this writing, no court has rendered a decision in an intrusion
action challenging a private employer's mandatory drug testing pro-
gram.46 Moreover, no intrusion cases of any kind were reported in
Nebraska as of December 1987.47 However, a survey of court decisions
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment b (1977).
40. Id. § 652B. Section 652B providest "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another ... is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person."
41. Id
42. WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 26.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b (1977).
44. Id-
45. See id. § 652B.
46. WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 26.
47. It is not too surprising that no intrusion cases were reported in Nebraska because
the Nebraska legislature did not enact the statutory right of privacy until eight
years ago. 1979 Neb. Laws 394. However, an employee recently filed an intrusion
action against his former employer based on the private employer requiring its
employees to submit to drug testing as a condition of continuing employment.
Rogers v. Excel Corp., No. 8143 Dist. Ct. Colfax County, Neb. (filed Oct. 28, 1987).
With the passage of these statutory privacy rights, the legislature effectively re-
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in other states considering intrusion claims in various contexts will
provide a basic understanding of what an employee must show to es-
tablish a prima facie case of intrusion upon solitude.
A. The Intrusion Element
As a threshold matter, no intrusion exists where the employee has
no legitimate expectation of privacy. In Kemp v. Block,48 the plaintiff
brought a wrongful disclosure action against his former employer and
a former co-worker who had recorded the plaintiff's argument with
his foreman. The Kemp court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.49
The court reasoned that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation
of privacy. The plaintiff and his foreman had argued in loud voices in
a small work area where the co-worker had a right to be, and where
the argument could be overheard by all co-workers who were pres-
ent.5 0 Given these factors, the court determined that the plaintiff had
displayed neither a subjective nor an objective expectation of
privacy.51
In determining that the plaintiff employee had no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy, the Kemp court articulated a two-tiered analysis
as follows:
The determination of whether [the plaintiff employee] had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy involves two lines of inquiry: First, by his conduct, the plain-
tiff must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, i.e., he
must have shown that he sought to preserve his conversation with [his former
foreman] as private. Second, it must be decided whether the plaintiff's expec-
tation, viewed objectively, was ... one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.5 2
Courts considering the reasonableness of public employee drug
testing have applied this two-tiered test to determine whether employ-
ees had legitimate privacy expectations which were intruded upon by
the drug test "search and seizure" regardless of whether the "search"
was reasonable under the fourth amendment.5 3 For example, in Lov-
vorn v. City of Chattanooga,54 the court, relying on United States
sponded to the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding that there was no common law
right of privacy in Nebraska. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73
N.W.2d 803 (1955) (court dismissed plaintiff's right of privacy claim based on the
appropriation of his name and reputation for the defendant's commercial benefit
reasoning the right did not exist in Nebraska common law).
48. 607 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Nev. 1985).
49. 1d. at 1262, 1265.
50. Id. at 1264.
51. Id
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
54. 647 F. Supp. 875, 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (city's requiring fire fighters to undergo
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Supreme Court precedent, held that public employees had to show a
legitimate expectation of privacy to invoke the fourth amendment's
protection. The Lovvorn court determined that public employees had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information contained in
their bodily fluids based on the application of the two-tiered test.55
Thus, in the public employee drug testing context, absent a reason-
able expectation of privacy, there can be no intrusion upon employees'
privacy interests.56 It follows that this reasonable expectation show-
ing will be carried over in future drug testing cases involving intrusion
claims by private, at-will employees. Courts considering these claims
would be justified in requiring employees to show their reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the information contained in their bodily fluids
because the employees must show the intrusion was one upon their
"seclusion or solitude." Furthermore, absent a reasonable expectation
of privacy, it is doubtful that an employee could satisfy the require-
ment that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."
As a practical matter, it should be fairly easy for private, at-will
employees to make the requisite "reasonable expectation" showing.
The courts considering public employee drug testing challenges have
almost uniformly held, absent special circumstances, that public em-
ployees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
contained in their bodily fluids.
K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti 57 was an intrusion case in which the court
required a private, at-will employee to satisfy the two-tiered "reason-
able expectation" test to establish that the employer intruded upon
the employee's solitude.58 Trotti arose when an employee brought an
action against her employer after management personnel searched
her locker and the personal effects therein.5 9 The employee had se-
cured, with managment's knowledge, her locker with her own lock. 60
The Trotti court determined that the employee had displayed a le-
gitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker and its con-
tents.61 The court explained the interrelationship between showing a
reasonable expectation of privacy and establishing the intrusion ele-
ment as follows:
mandatory, random drug testing held unconstitutional violation of fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures due to lack of indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion directed at persons to be tested). See also Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(blood tests subject to fourth amendment constraints).
55. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879-81 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
56. Id. at 879.
57. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
58. Id
59. Id. at 635.
60. 1I
61. Id at 638.
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[A]n employee in this situation, by having placed a lock on the locker, at the
employee's own expense and with the [employer's] consent, has demonstrated
a legitimate expectation to a right of privacy in both the locker itself and those
personal effects within it.
.. [T]here is no question the [employer] invaded the [employee's] privacy
by opening the locked locker....
The [employer's] improper intrusion of an area where the [employee] had
manifested the expectation of privacy alone raised her right to recover.
6 2
In short, there are two sub-elements an employee must satisfy in
order to establish the intrusion element: 1) proof of the intrusion it-
self; and 2) subjective and objective proof (two-tiered test) of a legiti-
mate, reasonable expectation of privacy (solitude or seclusion). As
earlier discussion indicated, private, at-will employees should be able
to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information con-
tained in their bodily fluids.63 However, the question remains
whether an employer's requiring that employees submit to urinalysis
drug testing constitutes an intrusion.
Courts which have considered the validity of public employee drug
testing have almost unanimously concluded a public employer "in-
trudes" upon its employees' privacy by requiring them to submit to
drug tests.6 4 The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey provided an excellent summary of the aspects of employee
drug testing supporting a conclusion of intrusion in Capua v. City of
Plainfield.65 In Capua, the court held that drug testing constituted a
high degree of bodily intrusion, reasoning that human dignity and pri-
vacy are adversely affected when an individual is forced to engage in a
private bodily function in a government agent's presence.6 6 The Lov-
vorn court echoed this sentiment and stated, "[m]ost people, including
fire fighters, have a certain degree of subjective expectation of privacy
in the act of urination."67
Employers may be tempted to avoid the intrusion problem by al-
lowing employees to fill a specimen bottle in private. However, as
long as the employer requires the employee to hand over the specimen
bottle for analysis, there is an actionable intrusion. It defies logic and
common sense to say there is an actionable intrusion when employees
are accompanied by observers when filling their specimen bottles, but
62. Id Note that the court emphasized the intrusion must be "improper," for exam-
ple, it must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. I&r at 637. See also supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
64. I
65. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (mandatory "surprise" drug testing of all city fire
fighters held unreasonable/unconstitutional under the fourth amendment due to
lack of individualized reasonable suspicion that any fire fighter was using illegal
drugs on duty).
66. Id at 1514, 1518.
67. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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no actionable intrusion when employees fill their specimen bottles in
private and are compelled to hand the bottles over to the employer for
analysis. Regardless of whether an observer is present at the em-
ployee's act of urination, the result is the same - the employer has
compelled access to private information from the employee's bodily
fluids.
An employer intrudes upon its employee's solitude when it re-
quires the employee to hand over the specimen as much as when it
intrudes and takes the specimen from the employee. Adoption of a
"hand over/take" distinction would create an artificial barrier to re-
covery. A required "handing over" by the employee certainly consti-
tutes the equivalent of a "taking" by the employer.
Nebraska's intrusion/invasion of privacy tort is defined in the Ne-
braska statutes at section 20-203. Section 20-203 provides: "Any per-
son, firm, or corporation that trespasses or intrudes upon any natural
person in his or her place of solitude or seclusion, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, shall be liable for an
invasion of privacy."68
Although this definition of the intrusion tort is similar to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts definition and the common law or statu-
tory definitions of other states, the Nebraska legislature has qualified
protected solitude or seclusion with the words "place of."69 This
unique language raises the question whether a private employer's re-
quirement that its employees submit to urinalysis drug testing consti-
tutes an intrusion into the employee's "place of" solitude or seclusion.
The answer to this question hinges on whether a narrow or broad
construction is placed on the qualifying language. It could be argued
that the words "place of" were meant to narrow the scope of protected
solitude or seclusion to cover only those places physically separate
from the person. However, a review of the legislative history of sec-
tion 20-203 reveals a legislative intent supporting a broader reading,
indicating an intent to include protection from physical intrusions of
the person within the meaning of "place of" solitude under section 20-
203.70
Senator Landis, the privacy bill's sponsor, stated the intent of the
proposed legislation was to incorporate "the accepted legal definitions
of the right of privacy which safeguard an individual's right against
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical and mental solitude or
seclusion."71
The qualifying language was not in the original version of section
68. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-203 (1986) (emphasis added).
69. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-203 (1986) with supra notes 40-41 & 64-67 and ac-
companying text.
70. Hearings, supra note 16 (introducer's, Sen. Landis', statement of intent).
71. 1& (emphasis added).
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20-203. The term "place of" was inserted into the bill at the request of
the Nebraska media to limit "minor irritant" lawsuits that could re-
sult from legitimate reporting practices.7 2 The media representative
who proposed the qualifying language at a hearing before the judiciary
committee originally placed a narrow construction on the "place of"
term, stating: "It is our feeling that most of the law in this direction
and in this area [intrusion] has been directed toward a place, whether
it be a home, a restroom, [or] any place one would reasonably expect
solitude or seclusion, but it should be limited to a place."73
However, when asked whether the media intended the language to
specify particular protected places of solitude or seclusion, the media.
representative responded:
I don't think there's any intention to specify any particular place. I think any
place of solitude or seclusion, any room, any place you would expect to have
privacy ... would certainly be included. I'm only suggesting that the term
place be included to suggest that we're not saying that somebody walking
down a public street... can have his privacy intruded upon by say somebody
that says hello.7 4
Clearly, the media's purpose for requesting the insertion of the
"place of" term into section 20-203 was to protect its ability to report
the news.75 It is equally clear that the media did not intend its pro-
posed insertion to exclude intrusions upon the person from the cover-
age of section 20-203.76 The media representative recognized that
"there can be eavesdropping, there can be mechanical devices, bugs
which may trespass or intrude upon a person."77 If it is nothing else,
drug testing constitutes intrusive accessing of private information by
chemical and mechanical means which are comparable to eavesdrop-
ping by mechanical devices. Although not conclusive, the current Ne-
braska legislature believes employee privacy interests are implicated
when their employers require them to submit to drug testing.7S The
legislature has a drug testing regulation bill before it which has as its
broad purpose the balancing of employer workplace interests with em-
ployee privacy interests.7 9
In summary, the courts considering public employee drug testing
have determined drug testing constitutes an intrusion into the em-
72. Id. at 23, 24 (statement of Alan Peterson, Nebraska media representative).
73. Id at 23.
74. Id at 23-24.
75. Id
76. Id at 23.
77. Id.
78. L.B. 582, 90 Leg., Ist Sess., (1987) (legislation proposed to regulate and set stan-
dards for employee drug testing introduced during 1987 session and carried over
to 1988 session) (legislative statement of intent) (L.B. 582 has been passed by the
legislature and signed by the governor).
79. Id.
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ployee's legitimate expectation of privacy.8 0 The Nebraska legislature
originally intended the intrusion tort to protect against intrusions on a
person's mental and physical solitude.81 Although no Nebraska court
has interpreted the "place of" term contained in the definition of the
intrusion tort, the legislative history of section 20-203 indicates the
original legislative intent remained unaltered by the insertion of the
qualifying language into the intrusion tort's definition.8 2 Therefore,
the Nebraska Supreme Court will probably determine that employee
drug testing is an intrusion upon the person which is a "protected
place of solitude or seclusion" within the meaning of section 20-203
when this issue reaches the court.8 3
B. The Highly Offensive Element
The plaintiff in an intrusion action must establish, in addition to
intrusion upon his seclusion or solitude, that the intrusion by the de-
fendant was "highly offensive" to a reasonable person.8 4 The question
of under what conditions mandatory private, at-will employee drug
testing is highly offensive to a reasonable person promises to be the
most contentious issue of future intrusion cases. Although no Ne-
braska court has yet considered the issue, courts in other jurisdictions
have produced mixed results in determining what intrusion the plain-
tiff must show to establish the highly offensive to a reasonable person
requirement.8 5
One federal court, considering a private, at-will employee's intru-
sion claim in the exercise of its diversity jurisdiction held that the em-
ployee failed to meet the burden of showing employer-mandated drug
testing was a "blatant and shocking disregard of his rights [causing]
serious mental or physical injury or humiliation to himself."8 6
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., the court did not
state any rationale for rejecting the employee's intrusion claim, but
80. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying test.
81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. The Nebraska Supreme Court may
have an opportunity to interpret the qualifying "place of" language of § 20-203 in
the near future. See supra text accompanying note 47.
83. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-203 (1986).
84. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
85. Compare Baldwin v. First Nat. Bank, 362 N.W.2d 85 (S.D. 1985) (answer and
counterclaim by debtor in collection action alleging "oppressive, willful and in-
tentional" bad faith collection tactics on creditor's part held sufficient to support
debtor's intrusion counterclaim) with Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space
Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985) (private, at-will employee failed to establish
the "highly offensive" element of intrusion/drug testing required as part of an-
nual employee physical; court failed to provide reasoning to support this
determination).
86. Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359,1370 (D.S.C. 1985)
(applying South Carolina law).
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the fact that the drug screen was added to the employee's required
annual physical (which the employee apparently implicitly consented
to) was probably a factor in its holding that the employee had failed to
establish the "highly offensive" element.87 As the following discus-
sion will indicate, absent consent, the Satterfield plaintiff may have
been able to establish the drug screen was highly offensive, even as-
suming it was a mere addition to a required employee physical
examination.
Most courts will probably find Satterfield little help in deciding
whether private, at-will employee drug testing is highly offensive to a
reasonable person in a given case. In Satterfield, the invasion of pri-
vacy claim was poorly plead, and the court based its decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of the employer on the employee's failure
to satisfy the publicity element of the "publication of private matters"
privacy tort.88 Absent interpretive help from private sector employee
intrusion cases, courts considering intrusion claims in the future will
get the greatest guidance for determining whether the private, at-will
employee has established the highly offensive nature of the drug test
intrusion from public employee drug testing cases.8 9
Of course, in the public employee drug testing cases the courts
have not determined whether the intrusion was highly offensive to a
reasonable person. Rather, they have decided the substantially com-
parable issue of whether the intrusion was unreasonable under the
fourth amendment.9 0 Absent special factual circumstances, "[a]ll
courts which have ruled upon the validity of urine tests for public em-
ployees.... have required as a prerequisite [to a finding the search/
intrusion was reasonable] some articulable basis for suspecting that
the employee was using illegal drugs, usually framed as 'reasonable
suspicion.' "91
87. Id at 1360, 1369-70.
88. Id at 1369-70.
89. See supra notes 5, 53-57 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 587-89 (N.D. Ohio 1987)
(mandatory drug testing of all police academy cadets held unreasonable under
fourth amendment in absence of reasonable suspicion that a specific cadet was
using alcohol or illegal drugs on duty); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F.
Supp. 875, 880-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1520 (D.N.J. 1986).
91. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 881 (E.D. Tenm. 1986) (stating
general rule of required reasonable suspicion showing for public employee drug
testing to satisfy fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement). For cases il-
lustrating "special facts," see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (drug testing requirement, absent reasonable suspi-
cion, held reasonable because testing was not a condition of continued employ-
ment, but only a condition of obtaining a desirable position which involved
carrying a firearm); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (random
drug testing of corrections employees held constitutional under the fourth
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The "reasonable suspicion" standard was implicitly adopted by a
majority of the United States Supreme Court in O'Conner v. Ortega92
as the correct standard for determining whether the search of a public
employee's office desk by his supervisor was reasonable under the
fourth amendment.9 3 In O'Conner, the Court balanced the public em-
ployer's interest in supervision, control, and efficient operation of the
workplace against the employee's legitimate expectation of privacy,
concluding that the reasonable suspicion standard was the appropriate
measure of the reasonableness of the desk search for work-related
purposes. 94
The individualized reasonable suspicion standard has also been
used as a baseline for judging the offensiveness of a private employer's
intrusion into the solitude of one of its at-will employees. In K-Mart
Corp. v. Trotti,95 the search of the employee's locker by the employer's
management personnel was held highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son. The Trotti court found the lack of individualized reasonable sus-
picion for the search of the employee's locker conclusive on the issue
of whether the intrusion was highly offensive. "[T]he [employer's]
search of the [employee's] locker and purse was wrongful. The mere
suspicion either that another employee had stolen watches, or that un-
identified employees may have stolen price-marking guns was insuffi-
cient to justify the [employer's] search of [the employee's] locker and
personal possessions without her consent."9 6
The reasonable suspicion standard is a logical and desirable base-
line for judging whether private, at-will employee drug testing is
highly offensive in a given case. Use of the term "baseline" means
absence of individualized reasonable suspicion as prima facie, and pos-
sibly per se, evidence of the high offensiveness of the drug test intru-
sion/search. Application of the reasonable suspicion standard to
private, at-will employee drug testing would promote uniformity in
judging the propriety of both public and private employer-mandated
drug testing programs. 97
The Trotti court's reasonable suspicion/highly offensive analysis
would be readily applicable to private, at-will employees' intrusion
suits opposing employer-mandated drug testing. Because Trotti in-
volved an employer's search of an employee's locker, it involved
amendment due to special "compelling" institutional security/public safety inter-
ests, making random intrusions acceptable to society as reasonable).
92. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (plurality and Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Id; see also Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 596 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
94. O'Conner v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1501-03 (1987).
95. 677 S.W.2d 632, 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
96. ld2
97. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (public employee drug testing cases
applying the reasonable suspicion standard to fourth amendment "reasonable-
ness" determinations).
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searching of an employee's place of solitude. Employee drug testing is,
at the very least, a search/intrusion into the employee's solitude or
seclusion.9 8
A final factor supporting the application of a reasonable suspicion
standard to offensiveness determinations in private, at-will employee
drug testing cases is the maxim that public employees, by virtue of
having accepted public employment, have a lesser degree of legitimate
privacy expectations than that of their private sector counterparts. 99
Given this higher degree of "legitimate expectation" in private sector
employees, it would be contradictory for a court to say that drug test-
ing public employees absent reasonable suspicion offends the constitu-
tion, but drug testing private employees, who have a higher
expectation of privacy, under the same circumstances is not highly
offensive.
Therefore, courts considering future intrusion claims challenging
the validity of drug testing programs for private, at-will employees
should adopt the individualized reasonable suspicion standard to de-
termine whether the drug testing intrusion was highly offensive to a
reasonable person. This standard's adoption would provide a worka-
ble baseline for making offensiveness determinations and it would
provide consistency between offensiveness determinations in private
sector drug testing cases and constitutional offensiveness determina-
tions in public sector drug testing cases. Finally, logic dictates that a
drug testing search of a public employee, who has a reduced expecta-
tion of privacy, which is "constitutionally offensive" absent reasonable
suspicion would be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person where
the drug testing search involves a private sector employee, who has an
increased expectation of privacy absent reasonable suspicion.
The "highly offensive" element of an intrusion claim should be
subjected to the same reasonable suspicion analysis under Nebraska
law as that discussed above. The language of the Nebraska intrusion
tort's "highly offensive" element requiring that the intrusion upon
solitude be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" mirrors the lan-
guage of the Restatement's intrusion tort and the language relied on
by the Trotti court in making its "highly offensive" determination.10
The same policy, uniformity, workability, logic, and common sense
98. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (examples of public drug testing cases
holding drug testing constitutes an intrusive search into the employee's privacy).
99. See, eg., Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 588 (N.D. Ohio 1987);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Allen v.
City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Turner v. Fraternal Order
of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. App. 1985).
100. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-203 (1986) with RESTATEm.NT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B (1977) and K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding highly intrusive element a fundamental part of the intrusion/invasion of
privacy tort).
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factors which support application of the reasonable suspicion standard
to "highly offensive" determinations in the abstract are supportive of
concrete application of the reasonable suspicion standard to "highly
offensive" determinations under section 20-203. Thus, Nebraska
courts should adopt the reasonable suspicion standard for evaluating
the offensiveness of an employer-mandated drug testing requirement
in future intrusion claims brought by private, at-will employees.
IV. VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO INTRUSION
Although alluded to in the prior discussion of the intrusion upon
solitude element of an intrusion/invasion of privacy claim, it is impor-
tant to expressly recognize the main drawback to the intrusion claim
from the employees' viewpoint. Employees must submit to the drug
testing intrusion to successfully maintain an intrusion claim. In intru-
sion cases in which the employees refused to submit to the employer's
intrusion, the courts have summarily dismissed the employees' intru-
sion claims for failure to state a prima facie case through failure to
establish the intrusion element.1o1
For example, in Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co.,102 the federal dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the
employee's intrusion claim because the employee refused to allow the
employer's agents to search his car as he left the employer's premises
at the end of a workday. The Gretencord court stated that the em-
ployee had failed to state an intrusion claim. "[The employee] has
failed to establish that any intrusion took place. He admits that he
refused to allow [the employer's] agents to search his vehicle. Having
successfully thwarted the commission of the alleged tort, [the em-
ployee] can not now sue for damages as a result of an act that did not
occur."
1 0 3
Additionally, in the public employee drug testing context, the fed-
eral district court in Everett v. Napper 104 held that the required drug
testing of city fire fighters did not constitute a "search" of the plaintiff
firefighter because he had refused to submit to testing.
For private, at-will employees who neither wish to submit to drug
testing nor to be discharged for refusing to submit, a suit for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy may be a viable alternative to an
intrusion suit in order to challenge a private employer's ability to
mandate employee drug testing as a condition of continuing employ-
101. See, e.g., Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982); Everett v.
Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
102. 538 F. Supp. 331, 333-34 (D. Kan. 1982).
103. I& at 333.
104. 632 F. Supp. 1481, 1484 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
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ment. Although at-will employees can generally be discharged for any
reason or no reason at all, many state courts have adopted public pol-
icy exceptions to this "at-will" doctrine when the employer's motiva-
tion for firing an at-will employee contravenes public policy.105
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized a public policy exception
to the at-will doctrine for the first time in Ambroz v. Cornhusker
Square Ltd.106 In Ambroz, a private employer discharged an at-will
employee because the employee refused to submit to a polygraph
test.1 07 The court relied on the express terms of a Nebraska statute,
section 81-1932, and held that the discharge of an at-will employee for
refusing to submit to a polygraph test was a violation of public pol-
icy.1 08 Section 81-1932 provides, in relevant part: "No employer or
prospective employer may require as a condition of employment or as
a condition of continued employment that a person submit to a [poly-
graph] examination ... ."109
The Ambroz court reasoned that section 81-1932, in clear and un-
ambiguous language, expressed the public policy promulgated by the
Nebraska legislature that obtaining or continuation of private employ-
ment cannot be conditioned on an employee's/applicant's submission
to a polygraph test.110 The Ambroz court also articulated the standard
to determine whether to recognize a public policy exception in future
wrongful discharge cases.
We believe that it is important that abusive discharge claims of employees at
will be limited to manageable and clear standards. The right of an employer
to terminate employees at will should be restricted to exceptions created by
statute or those instances where a very clear mandate of public policy has
been violated.1 11
Based on the standard for recognizing public policy exceptions to
the at-will doctrine in Nebraska, a private, at-will employee can make
a fairly convincing argument that discharge from employment for re-
fusing to submit to a highly offensive drug test intrusion constitutes a
discharge in violation of public policy.
The Nebraska legislature has expressed its intent to provide a right
of privacy to all natural persons "as described and limited by" the pro-
105. See, ag., Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984) (pri-
vate employer's discharge of at-will employee for refusal to submit to polygraph
test was wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because of state statute
prohibiting employers from conditioning continued employment on employee
submission to polygraph and "similar" tests); Ambroz 'v. Cornhusker Square,
Ltd., 226 Neb. 889, 416 N.W.2d 520 (1987).
106. 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510 (1987).
107. Id. at 900, 416 N.W.2d at 512.
108. 226 Neb. 899, 901, 903-05, 416 N.W.2d 510, 512-15 (1987).
109. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1932 (1981).
110. Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square, Ltd., 226 Neb. 889, 903,416 N.W.2d 510, 514 (1987).
111. IH. at 905, 416 N.W.2d at 515.
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visions of the right of privacy statute.1 2 Thus, Nebraska's intrusion
tort represents a clear mandate of public policy in favor of protecting
individuals from highly offensive intrusions into their solitude or se-
clusion by "any person, firm, or corporation.""13
Assuming protecting individuals from highly offensive intrusions
upon their solitude or seclusion is clearly mandated public policy in
Nebraska, the question arises whether discharging a private, at-will
employee for refusing to submit to an intrusion such as drug testing,
absent individualized reasonable suspicion, would constitute a wrong-
ful discharge in violation of public policy. Although section 20-203
does not expressly restrict private sector employer actions with re-
spect to their at-will employees, it does impose civil liability on "any
person, firm, or corporation" that commits a highly offensive intrusion
upon "any natural person in his or her place of solitude or seclu-
sion." 114 Therefore, a strong argument exists that a private employer
(any person, firm, or corporation) which discharges an at-will em-
ployee (any natural person) for refusing to submit to a highly offen-
sive drug testing intrusion (clearly mandated public policy) constitutes
a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
V. AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR INTRUSION
A. Employer Defenses to Private, At-Will Employee Intrusion Claims
The provision of Nebraska's right of privacy statute which sets out
defenses to invasion of privacy actions grants sweeping protection to
defendants in certain types of invasion of privacy actions." 5 For ex-
ample, a defendant in an appropriation action or a false light action
would have available "[a]ll applicable federal and Nebraska statutory
and constitutional defenses [and] ... all applicable, qualified, and abso-
lute privileges and defenses in the common law of privacy in [Ne-
braska] and other states.116 It is highly questionable, however,
whether a defendant in an intrusion case in Nebraska has any Ne-
braska common law privileges or defenses. In 1955, the Nebraska
Supreme Court decided, in Brunson v. Ranks Army Store,"17 that the
right of privacy did not exist in the common law of Nebraska.118 Since
no common law right of privacy existed when the statutory right of
privacy was enacted in 1979, no common law privileges and defenses
existed for the Nebraska legislature to recognize.
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-201 (1986).
113. Id- § 20-203.
114. Id
115. Id. § 20-206.
116. Id.
117. 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
118. Id
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Although other defenses listed in section 20-203 are viable, most of
these defenses are inapplicable to intrusion cases. The main common
law defenses to invasion of privacy suits are justifications for publiciz-
ing the private matter or image in false light and appropriation
cases.119 These justification defenses are irrelevant in intrusion cases
because their purpose is to rebut the publicity element of an invasion
of privacy claim, and publicity is not an essential element of a prima
facie intrusion case.12 0
Given the inapplicability of common law justification defenses to
intrusion actions, the employer's best line of defense is to attack the
"highly offensive" element. In employee drug testing intrusion cases,
evidence of an individualized reasonable suspicion that the employee
required to submit to drug testing was impaired by alcohol or illegal
drugs while on duty would support a conclusion that the intrusion was
reasonable. Such evidence would rebut the "highly offensive"
element.' 2 '
B. Employee Waivers
Obtaining voluntary waivers of intrusion claims from employees
before requiring them to submit to drug testing may be a valid method
for an employer to insulate itself from exposure to potential intrusion
liability. Although no court has ruled on the validity of such a waiver
in the private, at-will employee drug testing context, the EEOC's
guidelines for a valid private waiver of a claim under the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act (ADEA) establish objective criteria for de-
termining whether the employee's waiver was made "voluntarily" and
"knowingly."' 22 Specific criteria are listed in the guidelines which
would support an employee's waiver.
1) The agreement was in writing, in understandable language, and clearly
waived the employee's rights or claims....
2) A reasonable period of time was provided for employee deliberation; [and]
3) The employee was encouraged to consult with an attorney.123
Although a court would not necessarily require the presence of all
of the above criteria to hold an employee waiver of an intrusion claim
valid, the court would certainly require the waiver to be made volun-
tarily and knowingly. 124 Thus, if an employer incorporates EEOC
waiver guidelines into its procedures for obtaining employee waivers
of drug testing intrusion claims, a court would be more likely to find
119. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-202, 20-206(2)(3) (1986).
120. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text.
122. Legislative Regulations and Administrative Exemptions Allowingfor Non-EEOC
Supervised Waivers Under the ADEA, 29 C.F.R § 1627, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
146 DLRG-1, 1987 (July 31, 1987).
123. Id.
124. Id-
19881
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the waiver valid by virtue of its being knowing and voluntary. The
result is that the employer avoids both the liability and litigation costs
of defending against an intrusion claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Private employers' increasing reliance on employee drug testing as
their primary tool for protecting their workplace safety, security, and
efficiency interests is a primary cause of the rapid growth of work-
place privacy litigation. The future growth of employee intrusion/in-
vasion of privacy claims will be largely attributable to private, at-will
employees' discovery of the intrusion tort's simplicity and applicability
to private employer-mandated drug testing programs.
In order to establish that the required drug testing constituted an
intrusion upon the employee's place of solitude or seclusion, the pri-
vate employee will have to establish a legitimate, reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the area intruded upon by the employer. In general,
employees will usually be able to establish that they have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information contained in their bodily
fluids. Thus, satisfying the "intrusion upon solitude" element should
be a fairly easy matter for employees in drug testing intrusion cases.
The individualized reasonable suspicion standard is a logical and
workable baseline for testing whether the drug test intrusion is highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Under this proposed standard, re-
quiring an employee to submit to drug testing, absent individualized
reasonable suspicion, would constitute prima facie (and possibly per
se) evidence to satisfy the "highly offensive" element.
The bulk of common law and statutory defenses to invasion of pri-
vacy claims are designed to attack the publicity element of appropria-
tion and false light claims. Thus, because publicity is not a part of a
prima facie intrusion case, most defenses will be unavailable to private
employers defending against drug testing intrusion claims by their at-
will employees. Therefore, the employer's best defense against an em-
ployee intrusion claim is to attack the "highly offensive" element by
showing that the required drug testing was based on individualized
reasonable suspicion.
Employers will also want to consider obtaining employee waivers
of their intrusion claims, prior to requiring drug testing, as a preven-
tive alternative to limit the employer's exposure to potential intrusion
liability. If a private employer can establish the at-will employee's
waiver of the employee's statutory right was made knowingly and vol-
untarily, the employer will avoid the litigation and liability costs of
defending against a subsequent drug testing intrusion claim by the
employee.
Finally, employees who are discharged for refusing to submit to
private employer-mandated drug testing programs cannot, as a matter
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of law, satisfy the intrusion upon seclusion element. However, pri-
vate, at-will employees in this situation may be able to convince a Ne-
braska court that discharging an employee for refusing to allow a
tortious intrusion upon solitude or seclusion constitutes a wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
Gregory D. Barton '88

